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IT’S COMPLICATED: WHY THE VOLCKER RULE IS
UNWORKABLE
Charles A. Piasio

*

I. INTRODUCTION
Unless you have been living under a proverbial rock for the past
three years, you are aware that America is in the midst of
economically-troubling times stemming from the recent international
1
financial crisis. On the heels of said crisis and its prominent role in
the subsequent and ongoing recession, elected officials, consumer
protection advocates, and many American citizens have been and are
2
still calling for financial reform, particularly in the banking industry.
Congress responded to these calls by enacting the most expansive
financial reform since the 1930s in the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall
3
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, commonly referred to as the
4
“Volcker Rule,” prohibits a banking entity from “engag[ing] in
proprietary trading” or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity,
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge

*
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Providence College; B.A., 2008, Providence College. I would like to thank Professor
Stephen Lubben for his invaluable guidance, assistance, and patience throughout
the development of this Comment; Professor Jamie Pukl Werbel for teaching me the
fundamentals of legal writing; and my editor Joseph Jakas for his constant support
and feedback.
1
See Craig Torres, Fed Cuts Outlook for 2012, Sees 8.6% Jobless, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
2, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-02/fed-lowers
-economic-growth-outlook-for-next-year-sees-8-6-unemployment.html.
2
See Michael McAuliff & Max J. Rosenthal, Occupy Wall Street’s Message Gains
Momentum in Congress, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2011, 4:15 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/02/occupy-wall-street-congress_n
_1071745.html.
3
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in sections of 12 U.S.C.).
4
See generally David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ Shifts
Power Away from Geithner, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/21
/AR2010012104935.html. The rule is named after its original proponent, famous
economist and former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker.
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fund or private equity fund,” subject to certain exceptions. As this
Comment will expound upon, defining what exactly is—and is not—
6
proprietary trading in the banking context is no easy task, but for
now it can be best understood as “when a [bank] trades for direct
7
gain instead of commission dollars . . . from processing trades.”
According to Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin—the authors of
the initial provisions on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest
within the Volcker Rule—the prohibition of proprietary trading
stems from the significant contribution of banks’ proprietary trading
losses to “the freezing of global markets, helping to precipitate more
than $17 trillion in investment losses and necessitating bailouts by
8
governments all over the world.”
The significance of the role proprietary trading played in the
banking crisis, and the subsequent “freezing of global markets,”
9
however, is far from clear. There is evidence that banks’ losses were
primarily due to extensive decreases in the value of long-term
investments, most notably mortgage-backed securities that banks held
to maturity rather than traded, in addition to collateralized debt
10
obligations repurchased from off-balance-sheet funding vehicles.
5

12 U.S.C. § 1851(a), (d) (2006).
See Kate Kelly, Banks Gear Up for a Battle, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703422904575039502973649716.
html.
7
Definition of Proprietary Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/p/proprietarytrading.asp#axzz1cbW3StI3 (last visited Aug. 27, 2011).
8
Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 515 (2011).
9
See Charles Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 39, 41–42 (2011).
10
Id. at 41 (citing RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES 173 (2010)) (arguing that
holding the mortgage-backed securities instead of the proprietary trading of such
securities led to banks’ large losses); Michael Mckenzie, ‘Super-senior’ CDO Investors
Flex Their Muscles, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms
/s/0/8473466c-0a85-11dd-b5b1-0000779fd2ac.html. It bears mentioning that even if
the banks held mortgage-backed securities and related collateralized debt obligations
to maturity, they were probably using them as part of a repo trade to get cash for
other investments, and that trade could lead to the liquidity effect the Senators
describe, without being central to the financial crisis generally. Mortgage-backed
securities are debt obligations that represent rights (or claims) to the cash flows
(proceeds) of mortgage loans. The mortgage loans purchased from banks and other
originators are assembled into pools by a separate entity (either a governmental or
private entity) that then issues securities that represent claims on the principal and
interest payment made by borrowers on the pool’s loans. See Mortgage-Backed
Securities, SEC (July 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.
These securities greatly depreciated as borrowers (often of subprime mortgage
loans) failed to make payments. Collateralized debt obligations are trusts that sell
6
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On the other hand, there is also evidence that proprietary trading
contributed substantially to the losses that some large commercial
banks suffered. For instance, Goldman Sachs recently disclosed an
additional $5 billion in investment losses, which brought their total
11
losses stemming from the financial crisis to $13.5 billion.
More importantly, the idea that proprietary trading was one of
the driving forces behind the financial crisis is highly debatable. In
fact, Mr. Volcker himself has actually said that “proprietary trading in
12
commercial banks was . . . not central” to the crisis. Furthermore,
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner testified that “most of the
losses that were material . . . did not come from [proprietary trading]
13
activities.” Senators Merkley and Levin state two particular goals of
the prohibition: “to protect (1) the U.S. economy from suffering
another debilitating financial crisis; and (2) taxpayers from again
14
being called upon to rescue failed financial firms.”
But in his
Harvard Business Law Review article on how the Volcker Rule fails to
consider the complexities of evolving financial markets, Charles
Whitehead argues that “the Rule’s ultimate intention was less to cure
a particular cause of the financial crisis and more to champion the
populist view that commercial banking should be separated from
15
investment banking.” This is evidenced by frequent arguments by
proponents of the rule—including Senators Merkley and Levin—that
proprietary trading had distracted banks from their fiduciary duties
to their customers and banks’ more traditional activities such as real
16
estate and small-business loans.
Serious doubts have been raised as to whether the Volcker Rule

bonds to raise money with the overriding aim of using the money to procure assets
with a greater yield (i.e., return) than that of the bonds sold to raise money for the
CDO. In this context, mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations
go hand-in-hand because the mortgage-backed securities often were a significant part
of a bank’s collateralized debt obligation’s assets. See Peter Eavis, CDOs explained,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 26, 2007, 10:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/24
/magazines/fortune/eavis_cdo.fortune/index.htm.
11
See Francesco Guerrera & Kara Scannell, Goldman Reveals Fresh Crisis Losses, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f1dcbf2e-1f56
-11e0-8c1c-00144feab49a.html#axzz1cbMyWCSW.
12
Kim Dixon & Karey Wutowski, Volcker: Proprietary Trading Not Central to Crisis,
REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2010, 4:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/30/usfinancial-regulation-volcker-idUSTRE62T56420100330.
13
Hearing Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony
of Sec. of Treasury Timothy Geithner).
14
Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 515.
15
Whitehead, supra note 9.
16
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 539.
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17

will accomplish its goals. Perhaps most notably, Volcker himself has
recently said that even with the Dodd-Frank Act, the problem of
banks that are too economically significant to be allowed to fail has
“not yet been convincingly settled,” despite being “the heart of the
18
reform question.”
But the Volcker Rule might not only fail in
rectifying the problems that led to its creation, it may also create a
slew of other problems such as eliminating potentially profitable
19
activities of banks across the board. It follows that this would result
in banks not only decreasing lending, but also lending at less
20
favorable rates. Further, the rule may decrease the competitiveness
21
It may also create
of U.S. banks in the truly global market.
uncertainty for banks that could stifle investing activities that the
legislature did not intend to be prohibited. Even worse, the rule may
incentivize banks to find out what is allowed under the Volcker Rule
by pushing the envelope or even attempting to disguise proprietary
22
trading as something else, such as market-making.
Whether any of these ill-effects will materialize is only speculative
at this point.
Regardless, the Volcker Rule is borderline
23
unworkable. This Comment fleshes out the Volcker Rule and the
problems that arise from the law’s ambiguity, complexity, and sheer
size. Part II describes the background that led to the Volcker Rule,
including a brief history of financial institution regulation, focusing
on the collapse of Lehman Brothers as an illustrative example. Part
III details the Volcker Rule and its ban on proprietary trading,
including the ambiguities that play a significant role in making the
rule ineffective. Part IV argues that the Volcker Rule in its current
form is not only misguided, but borderline unworkable and at the
very least unduly burdensome. This part explains that the statutory
language of the ban is too vague while identifying the problems that
17

See Douglas J. Elliott, Why The Volcker Rule is Still a Bad Idea, CNN MONEY (Mar.
21, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/21/markets/volcker-rule
-banks/index.htm.
18
Bonnie Kavoussi, Paul Volcker: Too-Big-To-Fail Problem ‘Not Yet Convincingly
Settled’, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2011/09/20/paul-volcker-too-big-to-fail-dodd-frank_n_971593.html.
19
See Elliott, supra note 17 (“It will also raise costs and lower revenues for banks,
pushing them to charge customers more in other ways.”).
20
Id. (“The Volcker Rule will raise the cost of credit to our suffering economy.”).
21
See Suzanne McGee, Wall Street’s Loopholes, UPSTART (Sept. 10, 2010),
http://upstart.bizjournals.com/views/columns/streetwise/2010/09/10/wall-street
-investment-banks-may-find-way-to-skirt-proprietary-trading-ban-in.html.
22
Id.; see also infra Part 0.
23
See James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2011, at B1.
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the ambiguities create as well as the adverse effects from trying to
reconcile such ambiguities. Further, Part IV concludes that such
ambiguities and possible loopholes cannot be eliminated under the
rule’s current misguided rules-based approach, and from both a legal
and economic standpoint, such an approach will lead to adverse
effects on the American banking industry. Part V sets forth the
recommendation that Congress should repeal the ban in favor of
legally
mandated
oversight
to
prevent
and
penalize
unethical/reckless proprietary trading including full disclosure of
banks’ trading activity to the appropriate regulatory bodies who will
have discretion in enforcement of the rule. In Part VI, this Comment
concludes by emphasizing why Congress needs to consider the
shortcomings of the Volcker Rule immediately rather than simply
letting the ban play out and hoping for the best.
II. BACKGROUND
The substantive federal regulation of the banking and securities
industries that is so well-established today really did not begin to gain
steam until the 1930s. Following the stock market crash of 1929 and
the Great Depression, President Roosevelt and Congress passed a
series of laws setting forth strong regulations of said industries,
24
including the Banking Act of 1933 (“Glass-Steagall Act”), the
25
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), and the Securities
26
The Glass-Steagall Act
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).
established an array of significant reforms, most notably the creation
27
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the
restriction of bank activities to establish a separation between
financial institutions involved in commercial banking and those
28
engaged in investment banking and securities trading. The creation
of federal deposit insurance was deemed essential to protect
depositors, and the imposition of restrictions on banks’ activities was

24

Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162
(1933).
25
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
26
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
27
Glass-Steagall Act §§ 8, 12B, 48 Stat. at 168–90. The FDIC is a U.S.
government corporation that provides deposit insurance, which guarantees the safety
of deposits in member banks, up to $250,000 per depositor per bank as of January
2012. The FDIC also supervises and examines certain financial institutions like banks
for safety and soundness, performs certain consumer-protection functions, and
manages banks in receivership (failed banks). See FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values,
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
28
Glass-Steagall Act §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. at 184–85, 188–89, 194.
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viewed as necessary because “commercial bank participation in
securities trading was identified as a major cause of the financial
29
The result was that banks were effectively
collapse [of 1929].”
barred from engaging in investment banking activities, and
consequently, there was almost complete separation from
30
commercial banks and firms engaging in investment banking.
On the other hand, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
31
instituted regulations on the investment banking industry.
The
Securities Act focused primarily on regulation of new issuances of
32
securities.
In particular, it prohibited the sale or offer of any
security that was not registered, or did not qualify for an exemption
under section 3, subsection A of the Securities Act, and also
33
mandated specific disclosures by the issuers of the securities. In
contrast, the Exchange Act mandated new rules for the secondary
trading of securities and is probably best known for its creation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to monitor and regulate
34
financial markets in the United States. Collectively, these three new
laws aimed to instill confidence in America’s financial system by
35
limiting the risks that investors and depositors create.
The division of commercial banking from investment banking
36
under the Glass-Steagall Act remained in place for decades. But
both technological and market changes—i.e., the development of
37
derivatives and securitization —provided “powerful new financial
29

Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 517 (citing JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE
GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 43–65, 100–15, 147–54 (Mariner Books 2009) (1954)). Many
people blamed the stock market crash in 1929 on commercial banks that were too
zealous in putting deposits at risk in the stock market, which the Glass-Steagall’s
separation of commercial and investment banks put a swift end to. See Joshua
Brockman, Death of the Brokerage: The Future of Wall Street, NPR (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94894707.
30
Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 517.
31
Id.
32
48 Stat. 74.
33
Id.
34
48 Stat. 881.
35
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 517.
36
Id. at 518.
37
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 972
(“During the 1980s and 1990s, federal regulators opened loopholes in the GlassSteagall wall in response to growing competitive pressures in the financial
marketplace. In 1987 and 1989, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) allowed bank
holding companies to underwrite debt and equity securities to a limited extent by
establishing ‘Section 20 subsidiaries.’ During the 1990s, the FRB progressively
relaxed its restrictions on Section 20 subsidiaries. By 1997, those subsidiaries could
compete effectively with securities firms for underwriting mandates.”).
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tools” for both commercial and investment banks, and the ideology
of financial regulation began to shift towards deregulation among
38
lawmakers and regulators. In 1999, President Clinton and Congress
passed the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (“GrahamLeach-Bliley Act”), which repealed the separation of commercial and
39
investment banks restriction of the Glass-Steagall Act. Under the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, commercial banks were now permitted to
invest and trade securities for their own accounts as well as offer
banking, securities, asset management services, and even insurance
40
products under one corporate umbrella. As a result, commercial
banking groups were now in direct competition with investment
41
banks. The purpose of the act was “to reduce and, to the maximum
extent practicable, to eliminate the legal barriers preventing
affiliation among depository institutions, securities firms, insurance
42
companies, and other financial service providers.”
Congress
believed that permitting such multi-service financial institutions
“[would] also lead to greater efficiency, lower interest rates, and
greater access to credit. It [would] also lead to greater innovation in
43
the new marketplace with greater competition.”
Due to intense
competition and the evolution of complex financial markets, both
commercial and investment banks grew dramatically, and continue to
44
grow today.
Notably, this was only fourteen years ago, and
considering that banks did grow dramatically, it is interesting that the
banking crisis has led to many advocating a return to the preGraham-Leach-Bliley Act regulatory climate with seemingly little
45
consideration of other possible solutions.
As mentioned, the
financial markets have become much more complex over the years,
and it is hard to understand why the legislature has approached this
issue as a one-way-or-the-other situation.
38

See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 518 (“The rise of competition from
investment banking and other ‘shadow banking’ firms put pressure on commercial
bankers, who responded by seeking to engage in activities that had long been walled
off.”).
39
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub.
L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
40
Examples include Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup, Inc.
41
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 519 (citing Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., How
Should We Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates?, in FINANCIAL
MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAHAM-LEACH-BLILEY 65, 65 n.1 (Patricia C. McCoy ed.,
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=291859).
42
H.R. Rep. No. 106-74, at 138 (1999).
43
145 Cong. Rec. S13883, S13912 (Nov. 4, 1999) (testimony of Sen. Evan Bayh).
44
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 520.
45
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8.
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No matter how one identifies the role that proprietary trading
played in the financial collapse of 2008, it is safe to say that the
Volcker Rule or any significant financial regulation reform would not
46
have occurred but for the collapse. In January 2009, the Group of
47
Thirty, chaired by Paul Volcker, released a broad financial reform
proposal, and discussion of the issue began at Senate Banking
48
Committee hearings beginning that spring.
The Obama
Administration’s initial reform proposal did not significantly consider
proprietary trading because the draft legislation that the Treasury
Department sent to Congress in August 2009 did not include
49
restrictions on proprietary trading. On November 10, 2009, Senator
Dodd released his first comprehensive financial reform bill, which
again did not include any provision restricting proprietary trading or
50
conflicts of interest.
On December 11, 2009, the House of
Representatives voted to pass financial reform legislation, which did
51
not include any restrictions on proprietary trading.
According to Senators Merkley and Levin, the next major date in
the legislative history of the Volcker Rule was on January 21, 2010,
when President Obama declared his support for a ban of proprietary
52
trading. The inclusion of the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act
seemed to be relatively hasty considering that the proposal was met

46

See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY, SUMMARY
(2010) (declaring that “Congress responded to the crisis by enacting the most
comprehensive financial reform legislation since the 1930s” while also noting that
there was no proposed reform plan until the summer of 2009).
47
The Group of Thirty is a “private, nonprofit, international body composed of
very senior representatives of the private and public sectors and academia” that “aims
to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues, to explore
the international repercussions of decisions taken in the public and private sectors,
and to examine the choice available to market practitioners and policymakers.”
History of the Group, GROUP OF THIRTY, http://www.group30.org/about.shtml (last
visited Nov. 3, 2011).
48
See Kevin G. Hall, Economists: Banks that Survive Need Tougher Rules, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/01/15/59763
/economists-banks-that-survive.html.
49
See Wall Street Reform: How We Got Here, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20100826004406/http://www.financialstability.g
ov/roadtostability/timeline.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
50
See Stephen Labaton, Senate Plan to Overhaul Wall Street is Unveiled, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2009, at B1.
51
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. § 1117 (2009).
52
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 533 (“The prospects for including a
restriction on proprietary trading in the final financial reform bill increased
dramatically on January 21, 2010.”).
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with much backlash; even Chairman Dodd described it as coming too
53
late into the process. Moreover, “when Senators Merkley and Levin
introduced their Prop Trading Act,” in early March 2010, it was
viewed as additional evidence that the rule was “dead” because,
otherwise, it would have been included in the overall financial reform
54
bill.
This belief was ultimately incorrect as Chairman Dodd
introduced a revised financial reform bill on March 15, 2010, which
included the Volcker Rule with the additional requirement that the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) conduct a study that
would include recommended modifications to the rule’s “definitions,
55
prohibitions, requirements, and limitations.” The SEC’s filing of
fraud charges against Goldman Sachs on April 16, 2010 has been
cited as a major momentum booster of the rule’s inclusion in the
56
Dodd Frank Act. On May 10, 2010, Senators Merkley and Levin
introduced a modified version of the Prop Trading Act as an
57
amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act. The amendment to the Dodd
Frank Act including the Volcker Rule was passed by the House of
Representatives on June 30, 2010, and by the Senate on July 15, 2010;
58
President Obama signed the bill into law on July 21, 2010. The
legislative process since then will be discussed in greater detail in Part
IV, but a few quick points bear mentioning here. It should come as
no surprise that Wall Street lobbied substantially throughout the
process, but what is surprising is the extensive public interest in the
legislative process behind the Volcker Rule, including almost 8,000
public-comment letters received by the FSOC in the initial public59
comment period.
Now, over two years removed from the rule’s
passage, and following considerable delays, the regulators have
53

See Randall D. Guynn, The Financial Panic of 2008 and Financial Regulatory
Reform, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (Nov. 20,
2010, 11:22 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/11/20/the-financial
-panic-of-2008-and-financial-regulatory-reform.
54
Id.
55
Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting S. 3217, 111th Cong. §
619(g)(1)(B) (as introduced to the S. Banking Comm., Mar. 15, 2010)).
56
See Guynn, supra note 53; see generally SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F.
Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (BSJ) (MHD), 2011 WL
4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011).
57
S. Amdt. 3931, 111th Cong. (2010); 156 CONG. REC. S3482-83 (daily ed. May
10, 2010) (amending S. 3217).
58
Jim Puzzanghera, Financial Overhaul is Signed Into Law, L.A. TIMES, July 22,
2010, at A1.
59
See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe The Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform 6–7 (Duke Law Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 2445,
2012), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2445.
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60

released a 298-page draft proposal that “includes 350 questions on
61
which the regulators have requested public input.”
In the end, the question remains: why target proprietary
trading? As mentioned in Part I, the prohibition of proprietary
trading stems from the significant contribution of banks’ proprietary
trading losses to “the freezing of global financial markets, helping to
precipitate more than $17 trillion in investment losses and
62
necessitating bailouts by governments all over the world.” But this
contention is highly disputed. For instance, Senators Merkley and
Levin point only to the unethical proprietary trading of Goldman
Sachs and Merrill Lynch—which both resulted in the SEC filing
63
extensive charges of fraud against them —in describing the ills of
64
banks’ proprietary trading. But the rule will have an impact on
2,096 U.S. national banks, according to a recent impact analysis
65
conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
Of those 2,096 banks, 1,831 will only have the minimal compliance
requirements, but still, the OCC estimates that the rule will create an
66
aggregate of $50 million in annual legal and compliance costs.
Further, the OCC estimates an additional $917 million in capital
67
costs. Most of these capital costs stem from the rule’s prohibition
68
on “banks having more than three percent of their Tier 1 capital
60

Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,84601 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter “Proposed Volcker Rule”].
61
Ted Kaufman, The Volcker Rule and Occupy Wall Street, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
17, 2011, 8:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-ted-kaufman/the-volcker
-rule-and-occu_b_1016053.html.
62
Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 515.
63
See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), cert.
denied, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (BSJ) (MHD), 2011 WL 4940908 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2011);
Press Release, SEC Charges Merrill Lynch for Misusing Customer Order Information
and Charging Undisclosed Trading Fees, SEC (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-22.htm.
64
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 8, at 515, 525–26.
65
See Silla Brush, Volcker Rule Will Cost Banks $1 Billion, U.S. Government Says,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10
-28/volcker-rule-to-cost-banks-1b-u-s-government.html.
66
Id. These costs refer to the estimated expenses incurred by banks on an
annual basis to comply with the Volcker Rule. Id.
67
Id. Capital costs are the one-time expenses incurred in a project. See Cost of
Capital Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/costofcapital
.asp#axzz1d3uD3Nqc (last visited October 27, 2011). So, in this case, the capital
costs refer to the expenses incurred by banks in bringing their operations in line with
the Volcker Rule.
68
Tier 1 Capital refers to a business association’s “core equity capital,” which
consists of the sum of the entity’s equity capital (i.e., stock) and disclosed reserves,
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invested in hedge and private equity funds,” and thus the majority of
these costs would fall on large national banks “with at least $1 billion
in trading accounts or investments in hedge funds and private equity
69
funds.” While these costs certainly appear large when considered in
a vacuum, they are not necessarily significant relative to the size of
the financial institutions in question.
Sometimes across-the-board regulation, even at the expense of
innocent parties, is necessary and just, but banks’ proprietary trading
70
is not one of those situations. Analysts have estimated that the ban
on proprietary trading “could cost billions of dollars in annual
71
Further, not only does the Volcker Rule take away a
revenue.”
potentially profitable activity from banks, it will be costly to banks, in
both the form of the aforementioned compliance costs and economic
72
consequences that can affect the entire American economy. For
example, Brad Hintz, a Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. brokerage analyst,
recently predicted that banks’ fixed-income desks could see revenue
fall as much as twenty-five percent under the measures of the most
73
recently proposed draft. Furthermore, the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association and consulting firms have warned that
“the Volcker Rule could lead to higher funding and debt costs for
U.S. companies and increased inefficiencies in trading that would
74
lead to lower returns over time for investors.”
These costs,
compared to the compliance and capital costs previously discussed,
and “sometimes non-redeemable, non-cumulative preferred stock.” Tier 1 Capital
Ratio Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tier-1-capital
-ratio.asp#axzz1mPA8bQcU (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
69
Brush, supra note 65 (“The capital deduction provision would affect 34
national banks with at least $5 billion in trading accounts or covered funds and
would cost them $770 million . . . .”).
70
See Andrew Verstein & Roberta Romano, Assessing Dodd Frank 143–44 (Yale
Law Sch. Ctr. for the Study of Corporate Law and Yale Law Sch., Research Paper No.
434, 2011), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/WGM_Roundtable
_July.pdf (“I have one banking organization that has got to shut down its prop
trading. In something like 30 years, there hasn’t been a single quarter in which
they’ve lost money, not a single quarter, even through the crisis. So why is it you
would want to restrain them from a market-making activity that adds liquidity to the
marketplace, which has been shown demonstrably to be safe and sound, and basically
rip it out of the banks?” (quoting Eugene A. Ludwig, former Comptroller of the
Currency under President Clinton)).
71
Victoria McGrane & Aaron Lucchetti, Volcker Rule Delay is Likely, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424053111904265504576564623589787108.html.
72
See Elliott, supra note 17 (“[The Volcker Rule] will do considerably more harm
than good for the economy.”).
73
See Brush, supra note 65.
74
McGrane & Lucchetti, supra note 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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are much more significant. This proposition received additional
credence on October 10, 2011, when Moody’s Investors Service said
that the Volcker Rule would be a “credit negative” for bondholders of
Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley
75
because they all “have substantial market-making operations.”
A counterargument to this support is that even if proprietary
trading is generally profitable, the risk of extraordinary losses
outweighs such benefit. The findings from the Dodd-Frank Act’s
mandated study of banks’ proprietary trading by the General
76
Accountability Office (GAO) help to counter such pushback. The
GAO’s study was based on data of twenty-six stand-alone proprietary
77
trading desks at the six largest U.S. bank holding companies from
78
June 2006 through December 2010. The GAO found that, over
thirteen quarters, stand-alone proprietary trading produced
combined revenues of $15.6 billion in six firms, but losses over the
five other quarters of $15.8 billion, resulting in an overall loss of
79
about $221 million. First, this means that, as a whole, the six banks
lost an average of about $12.25 million a quarter, which fails to
establish the extraordinary danger and risk of banks taking part in
proprietary trading. It also seems to explicitly go against the
proposition that proprietary trading is a significant revenue stream
for banks. If one were to discount the extreme losses of five quarters,
revenues would be near $20 billion. Even more telling is that four of
the six firms made money from stand-alone proprietary trading over
the four-and-a-half-year period, and only two lost money, which is not
readily apparent from the study because the GAO “portrayed the
80
activity in the aggregate . . . .”
While the fact that only two of the six banks suffered losses adds
doubt to the proposition that proprietary trading was a major cause
75

See Brush, supra note 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevance of
these companies having substantial market-making activities stems from the difficulty
in distinguishing between market-making and proprietary trading. See infra Part III.
76
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-529, PROPRIETARY TRADING:
REGULATORS WILL NEED MORE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TO FULLY MONITOR
COMPLIANCE WITH NEW RESTRICTIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTED (2011) [hereinafter GAO11-529], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11529.pdf.
77
Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs,
and Morgan Stanley. Id. at 3 n.5.
78
See id. at 14.
79
Id.
80
Bradley K. Sabel, General Accountability Office Struggles with Dodd-Frank’s Volcker
Rule, THE HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 26,
2011, 10:11 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/08/26/general
-accountability-office-struggles-with-dodd-franks-volcker-rule.
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of the financial crisis, looking at the data while eliminating the large
losses of five quarters seems to ignore the argument that the rule is
justified because the risk of large losses outweighs the potential
benefit. Even the GAO study indicated that “stand-alone proprietary
trading generally produced small revenues over several years as
81
opposed to large losses during the financial crisis.” But the key
phrase is “during the financial crisis,” and the merit of analyzing the
numbers without the extreme losses of five particular quarters is
justified because the proprietary trading that resulted in such
significant losses was due to the mortgage crisis rather than typical
proprietary trading. Banks’ losses resulted primarily from a decrease
in the value of long-term investments, most notably “mortgagebacked securities that banks chose to hold to maturity rather than
tradeas well as collateralized debt obligations they repurchased
82
from off-balance-sheet funding vehicles.” It was not the activity—
proprietary trading—that was problematic; rather, it was the
particular object of some of such activity that was troublesome.
Considering this in conjunction with the fact that only two of the six
banks still suffered losses on their proprietary trading, a prohibition
on all banks’ proprietary trading may be overreaching and ultimately
misguided. Even the GAO, while pointing out that proprietary
trading as well as hedge and private equity fund investments are
riskier than traditional trading activities, indicated that, outside of the
83
crisis, both activities produced revenue for the banks.
Presumably, the remaining justification for an across-the-board
ban, even though not every bank took part in unduly risky
proprietary trading, is that the actions of a few can have an
overwhelming impact on the market as a whole, especially if those few
are some of the most powerful banks. This assumption, while
conceptually valid, still does not adequately address the inequity of
penalizing all for the acts of some by prohibiting proprietary trading.
Rather, it simply sets forth an excuse for doing so. The fact remains
that there has not been any showing that proprietary trading
prohibited under the Volcker Rule was “responsible for the collapse
84
or near collapse of any regulated bank . . . .”
So, again, why
proprietary trading? Volcker himself was asked during his February
2010 testimony before the Senate Banking Committee to name a
81

Id.
Whitehead, supra note 9, at 41–42 n.10; see also RAJAN, supra note 10; Mckenzie,
supra note 10.
83
See GAO-11-529, supra note 76, at 22.
84
See Verstein, supra note 70, at 121–22.
82
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bank that had collapsed because of proprietary trading losses, and he
85
could not name any. Instead, Volcker answered that the rule was
intended to deal with future concerns rather than actual problems in
86
the past. Obviously, thinking about the future is prudent, but as H.
Rodgin Cohen of Sullivan & Cromwell articulately explained recently:
[I]t would seem that an expansive reading of a prohibition
is less justified when it is directed to speculation about the
future rather than being necessary to respond to
demonstrated problems. . . . [T]he regulators must take
care that the statutory provisions are not implemented to
87
cause the very damage they were designed to prevent.
While this Comment will expand on Cohen’s point in Part V,
Volcker’s comments and Cohen’s response provide an answer the
question of “why proprietary trading?” The answer is concern over
88
risk for the banking system.
A. Further Look at the Banking System and Why Its Exposure to Risk is
Worthy of Concern
In order to understand the Volcker Rule itself, it is necessary to
look further at the banking system to determine why there is such
significant concern over its exposure to risk. Thousands of pages
from the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”), obtained under the Freedom
of Information Act, and central bank records of more than twenty
thousand transactions from 2007 to 2009 recently uncovered details
89
of the largest bank bailout in U.S. history. Banks were in such a
bind that they requested and received from the Federal Reserve $1.2
90
trillion on December 5, 2008—their single neediest day. The fact
that the Federal Reserve provided emergency relief to the banks is
not problematic itself, as “[s]erving as a ‘lender of last resort’ is
91
historically one of the main roles of a central bank.” But the Fed

85

Id. at 122.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave $13 Billion
Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in
-income.html.
90
Id.
91
Matthew Yglesias, How the Fed’s Generosity Made $13 Billion for America’s Biggest
Banks, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2011, 8:39 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox
/2011/11/28/how_the_fed_s_generosity_made_13_billion_for_america_s_biggest
_banks.html.
86
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loans given to the banks were “among the cheapest around, with
92
funding available for as low as 0.01 percent in December 2008.”
Regrettably, while almost all of the loans were repaid and the
Treasury did not sustain any losses, the significantly below-market
rates of the loans allowed banks to make an estimated $13 billion of
93
income gained at the expense of taxpayers.
But again, these loans were not made to make up for losses
sustained in proprietary trading, and as the aforementioned GAO
study showed, the largest banks did not typically suffer significant, if
94
any, losses from proprietary trading. Many, perhaps most, banks
that received the loans needed more liquidity due to decreasing
confidence following the collapses of Bear Sterns and Lehman
95
Brothers, among others. In fact, when it comes to the true dangers
stemming from risky proprietary trading, the collapse of Lehman
96
Brothers is illustrative as it not only shows why many banking entities
take on such risk, but how better monitoring and control of such risk
could prevent an adverse, large-scale fallout.
Lehman’s business strategy was like other major investment
banks’ strategies at the time, as they followed a high-risk, high97
leverage model.
Lehman was a publicly-traded corporation and
thus followed the idea of shareholder primacy, meaning the
company’s foremost objective was to maximize shareholder value
98
(i.e., increase the stock price). The concept of shareholder primacy
stems from the fundamentals of corporate governance laws that have
their roots in agency law, namely the fiduciary duties that corporate
99
directors—the agents—owe to shareholders—the principals. At the
end of January 2008, Lehman reported record revenues of almost $60
100
billion and income over $4 billion for the preceding fiscal year. At
92

Id.
See Ivry et al., supra note 89.
94
See generally GAO-11-529, supra note 76.
95
See Ivry et al., supra note 89.
96
See generally In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 433 B.R. 113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
97
See Report of Anton. R. Valukas, Examiner, at 3, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings,
No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010 (08-13555 (JMP)), available at
http://www.jenner.com/lehman/lehman/VOLUME%201.pdf.
98
See Steve Denning, The Dumbest Idea in the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value,
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011
/11/28/maximizing-shareholder-value-the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/.
99
See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy,
18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 836–38 (2011). Of course, not everyone believes in
shareholder primacy. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006).
100
See Report of Valukas, supra note 97, at 2.
93
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this time, Lehman’s stock traded up to $65.73 per share, but less than
eight months later, “on September 12, 2008, Lehman’s stock closed
101
Three
under $4,” a decrease of almost 95% from January 2008.
days later, Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, “the largest
102
bankruptcy proceeding ever filed.”
How exactly did this happen to an investment bank that
maintained “approximately $700 billion of assets, and corresponding
103
liabilities, on capital of approximately $25 billion”? Well, the assets
were largely long term, while the liabilities were predominantly short
term, and because of this, to meet its liabilities, Lehman had to
“borrow tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in those markets each
104
day from counterparties to be able to open for business.”
Under
such a scenario, lender confidence in Lehman was obviously of the
105
In 2006, Lehman had decided to take on
utmost importance.
106
significantly greater risk and greatly increase leverage on its capital.
In 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis reached full steam, and
Lehman failed to recognize this “developing storm and its spillover
107
effect” upon its other business lines.
Instead of cutting its losses—remember the concept of
shareholder primacy, and note that corporate directors are elected by
shareholders—Lehman consciously decided to “double down” in
hopes of turning a profit and under the idea that the mass exodus of
subprime originators actually provided a substantial opportunity to
108
those who could weather the storm.
In doing so, Lehman
“significantly and repeatedly exceeded its own internal risk limits and
109
controls.”
This is an important point as it shows that a mess like
Lehman’s is not inevitable when it comes to proprietary trading, and
sufficient internal controls—if followed of course—can limit the risk
of the banking industry that Volcker invokes as justification for a
prohibition of proprietary trading.
It was not long until it became abundantly clear that Lehman’s
“double-down” strategy was doomed from its inception, especially
after Bear Sterns imploded in March 2008 as “[t]he markets were

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
See Report of Valukas, supra note 97, at 4.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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shaken by Bear’s demise, and Lehman was widely considered to be
110
the next bank that might fail.” But to buy more time and maintain
the previously mentioned critical confidence, Lehman used an
“accounting-gimmick,” legal under Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles—an example of the ills of a rules-based approach—to
111
“paint[] a misleading picture of its financial condition.”
On
September 12, two days after Lehman reported a $41 billion liquidity
pool, the pool actually contained less than $2 billion of liquid
112
assets. Lehman’s bankruptcy had widespread effects: the Dow Jones
index plunged 504 points on September 15, and on the following
day, in part due to losses suffered on its exposure to Lehman, AIG
was on the verge of collapse until “the Government intervened with a
113
financial bailout package that ultimately cost about $182 billion.”
Adding to the necessity of some regulation aimed at curbing
such risk, the Examiner in the Chapter 11 proceeding found that
Lehman’s senior officers did not violate their fiduciary duties
through their actions that led to the corporation’s financial condition
114
and ultimate failure.
But the Examiner also concluded that
“Lehman was more the consequence than the cause of a
deteriorating economic climate,” and in his report noted that by their
own admissions, Government agencies “might better have anticipated
115
or mitigated the outcome.” These two points—in conjunction with
the fact that Lehman consciously decided to take on risk greater than
its own internal controls allowed for—support the recommendation
that the ban be repealed in favor of legally mandated oversight to
prevent and penalize unethical or reckless proprietary trading,
including full disclosure of banks’ trading activity to the appropriate
regulatory bodies who will have discretion in enforcement of the
116
rule.
III. BREAKDOWN OF THE VOLCKER RULE
The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from taking part in
proprietary trading or investing in or sponsoring any private equity

110

Id. at 5.
Id.
112
Report of Valukas, supra note 97, at 10.
113
Id. at 13–14 (identifying the collapse of a $62 billion money market fund and
the congressional passing of a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program rescue
package as other possible effects).
114
Id. at 43–58.
115
Id. at 2–3.
116
See discussion infra Part 0.
111
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117

firm or hedge fund. This Comment will focus primarily on the ban
of proprietary trading, but will discuss some of the more important
implications regarding the regulation of banks’ investments in, and
relationships with, hedge funds and private equity funds. Thus, for
now, it is sufficient to point out that the limitation on investing in or
sponsoring such funds has three central purposes:
(1) [e]nsure that banking activities do not invest in or
sponsor such funds as a way to circumvent the Volcker
Rule’s restrictions on proprietary trading; (2) [c]onfine the
private fund activities of banking entities to customerrelated services; and (3) [e]liminate incentives and
opportunities for banking entities to “bail out” funds that
they sponsor, advise, or where they have a significant
118
investment.
The rule also mandates, among other restrictions, additional capital
requirements and quantitative limitations to be imposed on non-bank
financial firms supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal
119
Reserve System (the “Board”).
Subsection B of the rule required the FSOC to conduct a study
and make recommendations for the rule’s implementation with
specific attention to certain factors that include, but are not limited
to (1) protecting taxpayers and consumers by enhancing financial
stability through minimizing the risk that banking entities engage in,
(2) promote and enhance the safety and soundness of banking
entities, (3) reduce conflicts of interest between the self-interest of
banking entities and their customers, and (4) limit activities that have
120
caused unreasonable risk or loss in banking entities.
The FSOC
121
Study was published on January 18, 2011. The FSOC set forth ten
recommendations:
(1) Require banking entities to sell or wind down all
impermissible proprietary trading desks.
(2) Require banking entities to implement a robust
compliance regime, including public attestation by the CEO
of the regime’s effectiveness.
(3) Require banking entities to perform quantitative
analysis to detect potentially impermissible proprietary
117

12 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2006).
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS
& PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 6 (2011).
119
§ 1851(a)(2).
120
§ 1851(b)(1).
121
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 3.
118
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trading without provisions for safe harbors.
(4) Perform supervisory review of trading activity to
distinguish permitted activities from impermissible
proprietary trading.
(5) Require banking entities to implement a mechanism
that identifies to Agencies which trades are customerinitiated.
(6) Require divestiture of impermissible proprietary trading
positions and impose penalties when warranted.
(7) Prohibit banking entities from investing in or
sponsoring any hedge fund or private equity fund, except to
bona fide trust, fiduciary or investment advisory customers.
(8) Prohibit banking entities from engaging in transactions
that would allow them to “bail out” a hedge fund or private
equity fund.
(9) Identify “similar funds” that should be brought within
the scope of the Volcker Rule prohibitions in order to
prevent evasion of the intent of the rule.
(10) Require banking entities to publicly disclose permitted
122
exposure to hedge funds and private equity funds.
The FSOC study also stressed that regulators must be “flexible
and dynamic” in implementing and policing the rule, in part because
123
“markets, products and trading activities will continue to evolve.”
This is in reference to the rule’s requirement that within nine
months of the FSOC completing its study, the OCC, Treasury, the
Board, the FDIC, and the SEC shall consider the findings of the study
124
and adopt rules to carry out the Volcker Rule.
Thus, there was
originally an October 18, 2011 deadline for the finalized Volcker
Rule, but that deadline has lapsed as the aforementioned regulatory
bodies released their proposed draft on October 6, 2011, and the
125
public comment period did not end until February 13, 2012.
The statute mandates that the Volcker Rule take effect on July
126
21, 2012.
But as of January 2013, the Volcker Rule has not been

122

Id.
Id. at 26, 32.
124
§ 1851(b)(2)(A).
125
Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011); see
also Cheyenne Hopkins, Regulators Extend Comment Period on Volcker-Rule Proposal,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12
-23/u-s-regulators-delay-comment-period-on-volcker-rule-proposal.html. Some had
speculated that the delay was a “sign of the Volcker Rule’s complexity and
controversy.” McGrane & Lucchetti, supra note 71. This speculation has arguably
proved to be correct as will be expanded upon in Part IV.
126
§ 1851(c)(1).
123
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127

finalized, and thus, has yet to take effect.
Regardless, banks are
granted an initial grace period of two years to bring their operations
128
The Board may
and investments into compliance with the rule.
extend the grace period one year at a time, but cannot give such
extensions to a bank that exceeds an aggregate of three years, which
means it is conceivable that a bank can have a grace period up to five
129
years. Furthermore, the Board can extend the period even further
as necessary to fulfill a contractual obligation that was in effect on
130
May 1, 2010, to keep an interest in an illiquid fund. This is a one131
time extension, but may be as long as five years. Finally, additional
capital requirements, as the Board deems necessary, can be imposed
132
on any banking entity during the transition period. Implementing
these recommendations, specifically the ones that impose an
affirmative duty on banks to collect and test new data, such as the
quantitative metrics and to compare bank trading with hedge fund
133
and other proprietary operations, will likely be expensive.
The specificity of bank activity definitions will be crucial to the
rule’s effectiveness. Realizing this, the FSOC included in its study
some recommended quantitative metrics to help distinguish
134
proprietary trading from the rule’s permitted activities. While this
Comment will discuss these quantitative metrics and the implications
of the current definitions at greater length in Part IV, for now, it is
important to note some of these definitions. Subsection (h) of the
135
rule lists its central definitions.
As noted earlier, the statute
explicitly prohibits a banking entity from “engag[ing] in proprietary
trading” or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or
other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or private
136
equity fund,” subject to certain exceptions.
The term “banking
entity” means “any insured depository institution . . . , any company
that controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a
bank holding company for purposes of section 8 of the International
127

Fragmented U.S. Regulatory System Stalls Dodd-Frank Rules-GAO, REUTERS (Jan. 23,
2013, 6:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/23/financial-regulationgao-idUSL1N0ASHV320130123.
128
§ 1851(c)(2).
129
Id.
130
§ 1851(c)(3)(A).
131
§ 1851(c)(3)(B).
132
§ 1851(c)(5).
133
See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 52; see also Stewart, supra note 23.
134
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 36–37.
135
§ 1851(h).
136
§ 1851(a), (d).
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Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or subsidiary of any such
137
entity.”
The term “proprietary trading,” as used in the statute, is defined
as
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the
banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by
the Board in any transaction to purchase or sell, or
otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative,
any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any
option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any
other security or financial instrument that the appropriate
Federal banking agencies, the [SEC], and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided in
138
subsection (b)(2), determine.
Central to this definition is the term “trading account,” which is
defined as “any account used for acquiring or taking positions in
securities and [financial] instruments . . . for the purpose of selling in
the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit
from short-term price movements)” and other accounts the
139
Again, the implications—including some
regulators may identify.
problems that the ambiguity and/or impracticality of the definitions
create—are expounded upon in Part IV.
Subsection (d) of the Volcker Rule lists exemptions from the
rule in the form of permitted activities that would otherwise be
140
considered proprietary trading.
Permitted activities include, but
141
142
are not limited to, market-making, hedging to mitigate risk,
143
trading activities “on behalf of customers,” and proprietary trading
conducted by a banking entity provided that the trading occurs
“solely outside of the United States and [] the banking entity is not
directly or indirectly controlled by a banking entity that is organized
144
under the laws of the United States or of one or more States.” All
four of these permitted activities raise serious questions, and
depending on how they are interpreted, can possibly lead to adverse
effects on the American economy. This point is discussed further in
137

§ 1851(h)(1)(A)–(D). Certain limited purpose trust institutions are not
considered banking entities under this section.
138
§ 1851(h)(4).
139
§ 1851(h)(6).
140
§ 1851(d).
141
§ 1851(d)(1)(B).
142
§ 1851(d)(1)(C).
143
§ 1851(d)(1)(D).
144
§ 1851(d)(1)(H).
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Part IV.
The full scope of the permitted activities remains to be finalized
as the rule also gives regulators the ability to permit any trading
activities that “promote and protect the safety and soundness of
145
banking entities and U.S. financial stability.”
But any of the
otherwise-permitted activities will still be prohibited if it will result in
a “material conflict of interest” with clients or a “material exposure to
146
high-risk assets or high-risk trading activities.”
The FSOC Study included factors—with minimal detail—that
147
regulators can consider.
For instance, Charles Whitehead has
argued that one of the factors—”that concerns are ‘elevated’ when
instruments are complex, highly structured or opaque, illiquid or
hard-to-value”—would “require coordination across multiple business
units within a bank, or involve significant information
148
asymmetries.”
Furthermore, assets and/or strategies can be
considered “high risk” simply because “they involve new products
with rapid growth, embedded leverage, high volatility, or assets whose
149
values cannot be externally [priced] or effectively hedged.”
Until
regulators make it clear how they will make “high risk” and “material
conflict of interest” determinations, there will be significant
uncertainty for banks. This could have the unfortunate consequence
of stifling banks’ investment activities that the Volcker Rule was not
150
intended to encompass.
The two most significant permitted activities are market-making
151
152
and hedging. Neither term is precisely defined in the rule. This
is another area of concern going forward, but it is not necessarily fair
to blame the rule-makers and regulatory bodies for this, as
distinguishing
market-making
from
prohibited
speculative
153
proprietary trading is far from easy.
It is worth noting that this is
particularly disconcerting because of the integral role that marketmaking plays in banks’ capital-raising by “helping to fill a temporal
154
gap between sellers and buyers of financial assets.” Put a different
way, market-making is a traditional bank function as it provides
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

§ 1851(d)(1)(J); see FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 16.
§ 1851(d)(2)(A).
See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 16.
See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50.
Id.
See infra Part 0.
§ 1851(d)(1)(B), (C).
Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011).
See infra Part 0.
Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50.
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liquidity to lenders without affecting borrowers’ access to reliable
sources of capital; the difference is that it relies “on capital markets
155
Market-making
rather than traditional buying channels.”
accomplishes this by having banks serve as the middle-man between
clients aiming to buy or sell financial assets and third parties seeking
156
to sell or buy the same assets. Bank customers can either sell assets
immediately to a market-maker or delay the sale until a sufficient
157
offer is found. The risk is that the price may move adversely to the
seller while they wait. Market-makers—banks—have the ability to
bear that risk and, therefore, offer immediate liquidity, but almost
always at a discount from the price that the seller might have
158
otherwise received in the future. Thus, the market-maker generates
income in the form of the difference between its purchase price and
159
the greater price at which it later sells the held assets.
Hedging is also an essential aspect of banks’ business operations,
160
and banks can hedge in numerous ways.
In their traditional
lending business, banks may hedge interest rates and credit risk, and
banks may also hedge their exposure to financial assets, including
161
those acquired in market-making activities.
Because hedging risk
can be accomplished in many different ways, and by hedging, a bank
can trade financial instruments, which in turn could replicate
proprietary trading, it may appear to an outside party that a
legitimate hedging transaction is a violation of the Volcker Rule since
162
a direct link between risk and hedging is not always possible. The
FSOC has realized this problem, and in its study, it recommended the
use of objective data points to help regulators distinguish between
163
proprietary trading and permitted activities.
In their proposed
164
draft, the regulatory bodies expanded the role of such metrics.
While this Comment will discuss some possible shortcomings of
these metrics, they are a step in the right direction and will definitely
be useful in regulating banks’ proprietary trading. As mentioned, the
155

Id.
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Felix Salmon, How Banks Hedge Counterparty Risk, PORTFOLIO.COM (Oct. 3,
2008, 11:44 AM), http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/10
/03/how-banks-hedge-counterparty-risk/.
161
Whitehead, supra note 9, at 51.
162
Id.
163
See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 36.
164
See Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011).
156
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difference between proprietary trading and the rule’s permitted
activities can be very difficult to determine, and these metrics do help
provide a clearer picture. But because the statute seeks to prohibit
proprietary trading rather than regulate it in a more discretionary
manner, banks and regulators will have a lot at stake when trying to
distinguish between the two. This begs the question of not only
whether a prohibition rather than a more discretionary regulation is
more effective, but also whether it is sensible. The rest of this
Comment will focus on answering this question, while ultimately
advocating for a more discretionary approach that would require
transparency of banking entities’ trading activities to the regulatory
bodies.
IV. THE VOLCKER RULE IS UNWORKABLE AND INEFFECTIVE
The aforementioned difficulties in distinguishing proprietary
trading from the rule’s permitted activities raise numerous issues.
Government regulators have been cognizant of these issues and have
165
gone to great lengths to combat them. Unfortunately, these efforts
have led to a tremendously complex rule that will be near impossible
to effectively enforce without unfairly and adversely affecting banks
and perhaps the U.S. economy in general. The result is a rule that is
not only unworkable, but also one that fails to achieve its intended
goal.
First, the aforementioned questions regarding the definitions of
the terms used in the rule have created a number of problematic
issues that the FSOC study and the regulatory bodies’ proposed draft
have failed to resolve. This ambiguity, combined with the rule giving
regulators broad authority to interpret and modify the statue, creates
uncertainty. This in turn can potentially inhibit banking practices
166
even further because banks tend to crave certainty. The rule and its
ongoing implementation process, however, will force banking groups
167
The ambiguous
to remain in uncertain territory for some time.
definition of proprietary trading and the corresponding definition of
“trading account” have created some critical issues. For instance,
trading activity varies among markets and types of assets, so what

165

See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118; Proposed Volcker Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011).
166
See generally McGee, supra note 21. Banks tend to crave certainty because the
nature of their activities (i.e., lending decisions—how much, at what rate, etc.) rely
heavily on not only the current state of affairs but the foreseeable future.
Uncertainty makes these activities riskier and more difficult.
167
Id.
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constitutes a “near term” or “short term” transaction for one
168
Further,
instrument could be significantly different for another.
this definition makes the prospect of uniform enforcement much less
likely because different firms employ different trading strategies.
Accordingly, what the regulators would view as constituting
169
proprietary trading at one firm may not be the same at another.
The lack of a definition for the permitted activity of marketmaking is even more problematic. As discussed in Parts II and III,
170
banks generate revenue from market-making. Banks are contacted
171
Traders
daily to trade billions of dollars of financial instruments.
outside of a bank can buy, sell, and even speculate in financial
172
instruments from derivatives to gold. Whitehead uses the example
of airlines that buy oil futures to lock in energy prices and explains
that as a result, banks can acquire an inventory of such financial
assets and maintain exposure to risk in order to meet or prepare for
173
customer demand. Proprietary trading can be strikingly similar as it
accumulates positions with the expectation of profiting from future
transactions and thus, both involve principal trading with customers
or third parties where the bank may gain or lose as a result of short174
term changes in the market value of the assets.
This is why
distinguishing between two activities, one prohibited and the other
175
permitted, can be very difficult.
Notably, this lack of a definition is not the fault of the legislature
or regulatory bodies, but rather stems from the difficulty of
distinguishing market-making activities from proprietary trading. In
fact, any attempt at distinguishing the two through definitions may
prove fruitless as

168

Whitehead, supra note 9, at 48.
Id. at 49 (“A longer-term investment, for example, may be resold quickly in
the face of an increasingly volatile market. How can regulators distinguish between
changes in strategy and prohibited transactions?”).
170
See discussion supra Part 0.
171
See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50.
172
A derivative is “a security whose price is dependent upon or derived from one
or more underlying assets. The derivative itself is merely a contract between two or
more parties. Its value is determined by fluctuations in the underlying asset. The
most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies,
interest rates and market indexes. Most derivatives are characterized by high
leverage.” Definition of Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms
/d/derivative.asp#axzz1d3uD3Nqc (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
173
Whitehead, supra note 9, at 50.
174
Id. at 51.
175
See McGee, supra note 21 (arguing that “no one seems to know just where the
blurry line between proprietary trading and market-making is drawn”).
169
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Goldman Sachs—and other firms as well—are unlikely to
accept any regulatory finding that some of those marketmaking endeavors are really proprietary trading in
disguise. . . . [a]nd while [it is] technically accurate that
they aren’t[,] . . . the already-blurry line between marketmaking and proprietary trading [is] likely to become still
176
more indistinct.
This is a major issue, especially considering that at firms like
Goldman Sachs, proprietary trading, while significantly successful,
177
drastically pales in comparison to its market-making activities. Both
the FSOC and the regulatory bodies have noted that current marketmaking activities often include elements of proprietary trading and
that, in conjunction with differences in market-making for various
assets and markets, distinguishing between permissible and
178
impermissible trading is significantly challenging.
In recognition of such difficulties, the regulatory bodies have
mandated the use of quantitative metrics by banks to help distinguish
179
prohibited proprietary trading from the rule’s permitted activities.
Whitehead, however, makes the astute observation that while the
metrics will assist banks’ compliance with the Volcker Rule, they
create the risk of trading strategies that satisfy the objective
quantitative metrics while still violating the legislative intent of the
180
rule.
Moreover, the metrics may alter the way that banks do
business to comply with the definitions of permitted activities, which
could have the unfortunate consequence of delaying the emergence
181
of novel instruments and strategies. As this Comment will explain
further in Part V, these potential problems with the metrics only exist
because they would be used under the backdrop of a bright-line
prohibition. If the rule were discretionary, these quantitative metrics
would be very helpful in providing adequate clarity to combat the
uncertainty that would come with such a discretionary approach.
Another problem arising from defining key terms in the rule
stems from its exception of banks that operate “solely” outside the
182
United States.
Foreign banks claim that a strict interpretation of
176

Id.
Id.
178
See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118; Proposed Volcker Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011).
179
See discussion supra Part 0; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 118,
at 50.
180
See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 51.
181
Id.
182
12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2006).
177
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the rule may also force them to fire, or in the best case, relocate U.S.
employees who are involved in proprietary trading, even if no
183
American money is at risk. Foreign banks frequently hire American
investment advisers and managers to work on offshore proprietary
trading, and according to the Institute of International Bankers
(IIB), if such trading were forbidden under the Volcker Rule because
U.S. employees are involved, the banks would simply move those jobs
184
overseas. Sally Miller, the CEO of the IIB, has said that “it’s a jobs
185
issue—if we can’t use a U.S. sub-adviser, we’re going to use an
adviser sitting in London or Frankfurt, so that job is not here
186
anymore.”
International banks employ more than 250,000 U.S.
citizens and permanent residents according to the IIB; Credit Suisse
Group AG, Societe Generale, and Deutsche Bank AG are among the
overseas banks that manage trades in the United States and would be
187
affected by the rule.
Furthermore, extending the Volcker Rule to
foreign banks could make U.S. securities less attractive to foreign
banks, according to Miller, because employing U.S. firms as sub188
advisers encourages foreign banks to invest in American securities.
This incidental effect is intuitive, as employing U.S. firms naturally
increases foreign banks’ awareness of U.S. securities because such
American firms will often bring these securities to the attention of
foreign banks in the course of their business relationship.
Finally, perhaps the most significant issue with the “solely
outside the U.S.” exemption is that it places domestic banks at a
disadvantage to foreign rivals that are not subject to the same
restrictions in their home countries. Wayne Abernathy, the Vice
President of the American Bankers Association, explains that, “[a] lot

183

See Kalyan Nandy, Volcker Rule Extension Risks Jobs?, ZACKS INVESTMENT RESEARCH
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/61017/Volcker-Rule-Extension
-Risks-Jobs (explaining with supporting quotes from the CEO of the International
Banks Institute that the rule is believed to extend to any foreign bank with
operations within the United States, and if this is the case, foreign banks will close
any U.S. operations, which currently employ over 200,000 Americans).
184
Id.
185
A sub-adviser is another management team or firm that manages a sub-advised
fund, such as a hedge fund or mutual fund, rather than the firm where the assets are
held. Definition of Sub-Advised Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/s/subadvisedfund.asp#axzz2CFFxISmb (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
186
Cheyenne Hopkins & Ian Katz, Volcker Rule May Be Extended to Overseas Banks
With Operations in the U.S., BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-16/volcker-rule-may-be-extended-to
-overseas-banks-with-operations-in-the-u-s-.html.
187
Id.
188
Id.
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of what the banks have been doing in recent years to diversify their
services are activities that can easily be done by foreign
189
Further, banks will lose their top traders, and “that
competitors.”
ground will have been ceded to hedge funds, foreign financial
190
institutions, and specialist trading firms.”
In their previouslymentioned study, the GAO admitted that foreign regulators indicated
that the Volcker Rule could cause U.S. banks to lose business to their
191
competitors in Europe and elsewhere.
Of course, this is an easy
argument to make—especially at this speculative stage—but banks in
other countries are subject to other, different requirements such as
192
much higher capital requirements for European banks, and it is
unclear as to which rule is worse from a bank’s perspective.
Even if the rule was effective in eliminating banks’ direct risk
exposure, there is still the question of whether they will continue to
be exposed to such risk in an indirect manner. In regard to the rule
failing to decrease banks’ risk exposure, Whitehead posits that the
rule’s prohibited activity by banks will shift to hedge funds, if it has
193
not done so already. Whitehead argues that the Volcker Rule failed
to take into account the new relationships within evolving financial
markets:
Over the past thirty years, new market participants—in
many cases, hedge funds—have begun to perform bank-life
functions that permit banks to extend more credit or do so
at lower cost. By causing proprietary trading to move to the
hedge fund industry, banks continue to be exposed to the
same risks—perhaps less directly than before, but now in an
194
industry also subject to less regulation.
This “be-careful-what-you-wish-for” point is important because
shifting the risk to an industry with significantly less regulation not
only fails to rectify the concerns that inspired the Volcker Rule, it may
also increase such concerns because an industry like hedge funds
incentivizes risk-taking.
Regulators have made great attempts to address such issues, but
the result is a proposed draft that is 298 pages accompanied by 1,300

189

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See McGee, supra note 21.
191
See GAO-11-529, supra note 76, at 28.
192
David Enrich, EU’s Banks Must Keep Shields Up, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2012, 2:29
PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390444223104578034331569558620.html.
193
Whitehead, supra note 9, at 72–73.
194
Id.
190
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195

questions covering 400 topics.
Despite the regulators’ best
intentions, this increased complexity has made the rule borderline
196
The draft
unworkable while also exacerbating its ineffectiveness.
itself notes that putting the Volcker Rule into operation “often
involves subtle distinctions that are difficult both to describe
197
comprehensively within regulation and to evaluate in practice.” In
attempting to shed light on such subtle distinctions, regulators have
provided a possible path for circumventing the ban through its
198
permitted activities.
Put differently, it could turn out to be
relatively simple for banks to continue to take proprietary bets with
their own capital when they choose:
[S]hutting off one kind of risk taking—proprietary
trading—won’t necessarily reduce the amount of risks
banks take, especially as the crisis recedes further in time
and bankers begin to breathe more easily. Rather, there is
a risk that it will simply change the type of risk that those
institutions take. True, a bank won’t be putting its capital
on the line in a prop-trading division, but will it compensate
by allocating more capital to its market-makers and
encouraging them to take more risk? Or by looking for new
ways to earn higher returns from new and riskier
businesses—the next-generation of subprime structured
199
products, whatever they prove to be?
Even some that have previously supported the Volcker Rule agree
with this notion. As former Senator Ted Kaufman, Democrat of
Delaware, has said, “the key word in the rules [is] ‘exemption’ . . . as
soon as you see that, it’s pronounced ‘loophole.’ That’s what it
means in English. . . . I know these folks, these Wall Street guys . . .
200
[y]ou give them the smallest little hole, and they’ll run through it.”
Representative Peter Welch, Democrat of Vermont, added, “I support
the concept of the Volcker Rule . . . but these rules aren’t going to be
201
effective. We’ve taken something simple and made it complex.”
Even Mr. Volcker has admitted to being disappointed with the rule in

195
196
197

Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011).
See Stewart, supra note 23.
Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01, 68,849 (proposed Nov. 7,

2011).
198

Ben Protess, Banking Industry Revamp Moves Step Closer to Law, DEALBOOK (Oct.
11, 2011, 9:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/banking-industry
-revamp-moves-step-closer-to-law.
199
See McGee, supra note 21.
200
Stewart, supra note 23.
201
Id.
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its current state, claiming he would “write a much simpler bill.”
To further illustrate just how expansive Mr. Volcker’s original,
relatively simple idea has become, the proposed draft estimates that
banks will have to collectively spend more than six million hours
203
putting the rule into effect.
The agencies also estimated that
10,000 U.S. banks may eventually spend a combined 1.74 million
204
hours a year complying with the rule. This is a staggering amount
of time to spend on an activity that does not generate revenue or
provide customer service, especially for a rule that may ultimately be
ineffective. All things considered, serious questions remain as to the
rule’s practicality and effectiveness.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The significance of the issue and potential problems of the
current proposed regulation suggest that it may be best to start taking
a different direction when it comes to regulating banks’ investment
activities. The banking crisis and the subsequent bailout of some
banks illustrated the significance of the “too-big-to-fail” problem and
why we need greater regulation of banks’ investment activities. The
current approach of the Volcker Rule has proved to be very difficult
to define and implement with problems exacerbating the further we
go down the rabbit hole. While many would refute some of these
problems as speculative, the fact is everything is speculative at this
stage, and when dealing with an issue of this magnitude, it is better to
take a more measured approach rather than hastily pick a side and
205
hope for the best. The perils of the No Child Left Behind Act,
another well-intentioned yet expansive federal regulation that was
206
made in response to a crisis facing this country, support this. As an
alternative, a three-component approach would avoid the pitfalls of
202

Id.
Proposed Volcker Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846-01, 68,849, 68,938 (proposed Nov.
7, 2011); see also Protess, supra note 198.
204
Id.; see also The Value of the Volcker Rule, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-value-of-the-volcker-rule/2011/10
/18/gIQATZhUQM_story.html.
205
20 U.S.C. § 6316 (2006).
206
See Rachel D. Godsil, Opinion: No Child Left Behind at 10: Lessons Learned, THE
BERGEN RECORD (Jan. 15, 2012 7:10 AM), available at http://www.northjersey.com
/news/education/nochild_011512.html (suggesting No Child Left Behind’s
enactment was “prompted by a sense of crisis”); see also Shavar D. Jeffries, The
Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools for Stigmatized Minorities: The Need for Institutional
Remedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 38 n.147 (2006) (explaining that No Child Left
Behind’s accountability provisions, while well-intentioned, have resulted in micromanaging).
203
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the Volcker Rule while promoting positive regulation: (1) foregoing a
bright-line prohibition of proprietary trading in favor of a principlesbased regulation that gives full discretion to the regulatory bodies in
penalizing violations of such principles; (2) requiring full disclosure
of all investment activity, proprietary or not, by banks to the
regulatory bodies on an as-close-to-real-time basis as practicable; and
(3) imputing some form of significant personal liability to the board
of directors and individual proprietary traders for violations of the
rule.
The first step is discarding a black-and-white prohibition of
proprietary trading on banks in favor of principles-based regulation
that does not prohibit proprietary trading but instead gives the
appropriate regulatory bodies the discretion to mandate the
elimination and/or stay of banks’ particular trading deemed too risky
and to penalize egregious violations of the regulation’s principles.
These principles would include responsible risk-taking that does not
put the safety of a bank’s continued operations at any risk, due
diligence in assessing all trading risk relative to the amount of
exposure to the risk, and refraining from taking any position that
could be contrary to customers’ interests. The stated principles
would be the spirit of the rule. This would eliminate the unfairness
of an across-the-board prohibition of proprietary trading and escape
the unfortunate result of taking away revenue from all banks and the
207
problems that it creates. More importantly, it evades any inherent
limitation on the rule’s effectiveness. Bright-line rules typically
promote a search for loopholes as their very nature lends themselves
208
to “you said this, but you didn’t say this” defenses.
With a
principles-based approach, banks will be unable to make arguments
like “this isn’t proprietary trading, it’s market-making” to evade the
regulation because if regulators think it violates the spirit of the rule,
such classifications—that are likely under the current approach—
207

See discussion supra Part 0.
The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that provide the rules
of financial reporting for U.S. Corporations is a well-known example of a rules-based
approach that lends itself to such defenses, and the SEC has been considering
changing from GAAP to International Financial Reporting Standards, a principlesbased system of accounting. See Lance J. Phillips, The Implications of IFRS on the
Functioning of the Securities Antifraud Regime in the United States, 108 MICH. L. REV. 603,
616–17 (2010) (“[R]ules provide detailed guidance on how an entity should behave.
They decline to inquire into the substance of a specific situation and opt instead to
focus on the form. Under a rules-based system, a predetermined legal result flows
from the existence of certain particularized facts. . . . Conversely, principles provide
an entity with a broadly stated directive, but allow the entity flexibility in choosing a
course of conduct.”).
208
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209

would be irrelevant.
Regulators would have the authority to issue
injunctions on particular trading activity whether it is individual or
collective. Moreover, they can penalize egregious violations of the
principles including violations of any injunction issued. Because this
approach could lead to some uncertainty, banks would be able to
present a proposed action—similar to the SEC and their “no-action
letters”—to the regulatory bodies and receive a timely response as to
210
whether such action would be allowed.
Also, the quantitative
metrics currently proposed by the regulators could serve as a further
guide.
To be able to effectively exercise such authority, the rule would
require banks to disclose all trading activity to the regulatory bodies.
To be sure, transparency would be limited to only the regulatory
bodies, so this does not raise any “trade secrets” concerns. This data
would be kept in independent warehouses. In their proposed draft,
regulators have raised a similar possibility that banks might turn over
211
their data to independent warehouses.
Such disclosure would be
made as soon as reasonably practical, and because the independent
data warehouses would be online, it should not be difficult to disclose
almost immediately. In fact, having individual proprietary traders
immediately disclose a trade would limit the extensive time and cost
spent on such disclosure, as it eliminates the need to separately
collect such data and disclose it at a later time. When analyzing
banks’ trading activity, regulators must also consider the risk of the
activity in the aggregate rather than just that of individual banks
because what might not be deemed too risky by an individual bank
may constitute undue risk if banks in the aggregate take part in such
activity. This does raise the question of whether regulators would be
sophisticated enough to adequately analyze such activity. To combat
this, regulators charged with responsibility should be paid a
competitive salary, and while this requires increased funding, nothing
suggests that such increased funding would be any greater than the
costs of enforcing the current version of the rule. The severity of this
209

See discussion supra Part 0.
See No Action Letters, SEC (Mar. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (“An individual or entity who is not
certain whether a particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation
of the federal securities law may request a ‘no-action’ letter from the SEC staff. Most
no-action letters describe the request, analyze the particular facts and circumstances
involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and if the staff grants the request for no
action, concludes that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Commission take
enforcement action against the requester.”).
211
See Protess, supra note 198.
210
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issue suggests that it would be money well-spent. Another way to
increase the sophistication of regulators is to improve education, for
example, by providing incentives for universities to create
212
undergraduate and/or graduate programs in financial regulation.
The final component of this principles-based approach includes
imputing some form of personal liability to banks’ boards of directors
and individual proprietary traders. Failure to do so is a major
shortcoming of the current rule, as the proposed draft only includes
a question for public comment on the possibility of “C.E.O.
213
attestation.” The proprietary trading targeted by the Volcker Rule
“has a ‘tails I win heads you lose’ character, ensuring that profits are
for bank executives and shareholders, but losses are for everybody
214
else.”
Citigroup’s recent settlement with the SEC over fraud
charges stemming from some of its proprietary trading is illustrative
of this. While Citigroup is paying $285 million to settle the charges,
“its chief executive at the time the deal was marketed and closed,
215
Charles Prince, will pay nothing.”
Changing incentives helps to
216
control risk-taking where expanded regulation falls short.
Such
personal liability would require trading decision-makers, and those
who profit significantly from them, to share the losses when banks
fail. Regulation is the only realistic way to institute this personal
liability because even if shareholders and creditors significantly
pressured banks’ boards of directors to amend its corporate charter,
217
they would unlikely succumb.
This would be far from
unprecedented as even recently, provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
not only create the possibility of personal liability for executives at
publicly traded companies, but also subjects them to criminal charges
218
as well.
While imputing personal liability to bank executives will
212

Eugene Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Currency under President
Clinton, recently suggested a creation of undergraduate degrees in “regulation and
supervision” at the Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law’s Weil,
Gotshal & Manges Roundtable on Assessing Dodd-Frank which was held on April 1,
2011. See Verstein, supra note 70, at 129.
213
See Protess, supra note 198.
214
Claire A. Hill & Richard W. Painter, Another View: A Simpler Rein Than the
Volcker Rule, DEALBOOK (Oct. 28, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011
/10/28/another-view-a-simpler-rein-than-the-volcker-rule/.
215
See Stewart, supra note 23.
216
See Hill & Painter, supra note 214 (“Investment banks were compensated
extravagantly when their bets paid off. When their bets failed, they might lose their
jobs, but they could take lucrative severance packages with them and walk away from
a firm’s liabilities. Other people’s money was other people’s problem.”).
217
Id.
218
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (2012).
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likely lead to more measured risk-taking, increased internal control,
and improved information systems when it comes to proprietary
trading, the recent fallout of the “rogue trader” at UBS suggests that
it is at least possible that an individual trader can expose banks to
219
undue risk without the knowledge of a firm’s executives. While this
may have been the result of lackluster internal control, the rogue
trader has intimated that because he was fearful of losing his job, he
220
kept trading to get out of the hole. Personal liability of individual
traders would combat this as it provides something additional to
consider rather than simply fearing unemployment.
This recommendation, which grants full discretion to regulators
and imputes personal liability on bank directors/executives, will have
significant opposition, but there is at least one person who would
support it: Paul Volcker, himself. Mr. Volcker, expressing some of his
disappointment with the current version of the rule to the New York
Times, added, “I’d write a much simpler bill. I’d love to see a fourpage bill that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and chief
executive responsible for compliance. And I’d have strong regulators.
If the banks didn’t comply with the spirit of the bill, they’d go after
221
them.”
VI. CONCLUSION
The current version of the Volcker Rule, despite its good
intentions, will fail to achieve its goal of protecting American citizens
from hazardous risk-taking by banks backed by an implicit too-big-tofail safety net from the U.S. government. Adequately distinguishing
proprietary trading from permitted traditional bank activities such as
hedging and market making, as is necessary in implementing a bright
line rule, has proved to be incredibly difficult. Both the legislature
and its regulatory bodies have gone to great lengths, but it seems that
with every additional consideration, the problems of the current
Volcker Rule only intensify. Moreover, the American citizens—whom
the rule seeks to protect in troubling economic times—face adverse
effects from the rule, whether it be direct, such as facing additional
bank fees created by banks to make up for their costs under the rule,
219
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or indirect, such as banks decreasing lending or lending at less
favorable rates due to the loss of revenue from proprietary trading.
The common thread of these problems with the current rule is that
they are all a consequence of its bright-line nature in prohibiting all
proprietary trading.
The recommendation put forth in this Comment not only
eliminates this attempt at a black-and-white rule and replaces it with a
more appropriate principles-based approach, but it goes even
further. By requiring transparency in all trading activities on a closeto-real-time basis, this Comment’s principles-based approach forces
banks to put everything on the table, which should increase the
probability of spotting a potential problem before it snowballs into
catastrophic territory. This is because full disclosure by all banks
allows regulators to see the entire picture at all times such as the
aggregate of the banks’ trading activity, rather than having to piece
bits together. Finally, imputing some personal liability to banks’
boards of directors and individual proprietary traders provides a
direct attack on the “too-big-to-fail” problem.
Whether or not in favor of an approach similar to this
Comment’s recommendation, the legislature and regulatory bodies
need to reconsider their current approach. A “well, we’ve come this
far” attitude is inappropriate considering the magnitude of the issue
and the current state of the U.S. economy. Many believe reinstating
the Glass-Steagall Act could solve all of this, but as stated, such a
belief is an oversimplification because the Act would not have
prevented the banking crisis and its taxpayer-funded bailout. Still, it
would have limited the extent of the crisis, and thus, we should learn
from the hastily-done repeal of Glass-Steagall. When it comes to
regulating the American economy, before acting, it is imperative to
take the time to sufficiently consider the possible repercussions. A
failure to do so would result in taking an undue risk at the possible
expense of American taxpayers. Sound familiar?

